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Abstract—A Walrasian Market can be modeled as a distributed
system consisting a set of independent buyers and sellers. The
Walrasian equilibrium theorem proves the existence of the
optimal price that results in the market clean state or Walrasian
Equilibrium where the sum of absolute excess demand is zero.
It is proved that finding this equilibrium price is an NP-hard
problem. In this paper, we present an efficient distributed control-
theoretic approach for finding the Walrasian equilibrium in
an exchange economy. We have modeled the price adjustment
process as a closed-loop control system where the sum of absolute
excess demand is measured as the system error that is fed to
commodity moderators in a distributed schema simultaneously,
and then each commodity moderator adjusts the price of its
related commodity. We devised a controller algorithm with low
complexity and fast convergence that iteratively moves the error
value to zero. The proposed scheme, finds the equilibrium price
and Pareto efficient allocation without knowing the shape of user
utility functions or their preferences. It is scalable and is usable
for exchange economies with multiple goods and many types of
users.
Index Terms—Walrasian equilibrium, Dynamic Spectrum Al-
location, Pareto efficient allocation, Price adjustment
I. INTRODUCTION
A Walrasian Market is formed by a number of independent
commodity providers in a competitive setting that are serving
possibly numerous independent buyers both acting in ratio-
nally selfish manner. The clean state market is the condition
where the total demand equals the total supply. Since the
demand is function of the commodity price, in clean state
market, the optimal price P ∗ is calculated by commodity
providers in a distributed manner where there would be no
available excess budget or commodity. Finding the equilibrium
condition in a fully competitive market is a well-known
problem. The existence of an equilibrium in these markets has
already been proven and has been a well-recognized theorem
[1], [2], [3]. However, finding the equilibrium allocations and
corresponding prices is an NP-hard problem [4]. There have
been many attempts to propose efficient solutions for various
categories of problems. In [5], the authors offer a solution
for the case where the utility functions are linear. In [6], the
authors developed an approximate scheme based on reducing
the calculation of a Walrasian equilibrium to a polynomial
number of concave maximizations. It involves construction of
simple subdivisions and some form of exhaustive search in
the labeling process and the results may not be very accurate.
The authors of [7] investigate a computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) modeling theory and provide a general algebraic
framework including numerical equations to be solved for the
equilibrium values of economic variables. However, it does
not provide a detailed solution or guidelines.
Developing algorithms to reach a fair market equilibrium
has been a point of interest in many fields and in particular
in the context of next generation wireless service networks
[8], [9], [10], [11]. Walrasian equilibrium governed by the
laws of demand and supply is of particular interest. There
are a number of previous attempts to develop theories and
algorithms to find or move the system towards a fair Walrasian
equilibrium [4], [6], [12]. None of these works, however,
produced a general numerically sound approach to solve the
Walrasian equilibrium problem. In [8], load balancing in a het-
erogeneous wireless access networks (HWAN) is considered.
A ‘heterogeneous handoff management system’ is proposed
where three sub-problems, base station (BS) and radio access
technology (RAT) by mobile terminals and ‘weight restriction’
technique used by the base stations, are independently solved
and it is shown that applying appropriate weight restriction
technique results in a balanced equilibrium condition. In [9],
an autonomous connection management (ACM) mechanism
is developed to strike a balance between the overall system
throughput, load distribution in the network, fairness in access
to resources and user satisfaction in in HWAN settings. A
stochastic equilibrium analysis framework was devised that
showed favorable system conditions under various scenarios.
In [10], authors modeled the system dynamics as a novel
three-stage game creating a unified framework for spectrum
allocation, network best response and user welfare. In this
work, frequency spectrum was considered as a commodity and
model the spectrum allocation was modeled as a market dy-
namics problem. System equilibrium was analyzed by finding
the Nash equilibrium of the game through which the influence
of regulatory decisions and impact of network/user strategies
is analyzed. The devised model provides a framework for
the regulatory and network operators for adjusting spectrum
allocation table towards maximizing the social welfare for all
the players. In [13], the economics of spectrum sharing, which
is referred to as spectrum trading, is addressed in cognitive
radio networks. The authors introduced a market-equilibrium-
based spectrum trading mechanism that uses spectrum demand
and supply of the primary and secondary users, respectively.
Since spectrum supply is stochastic in nature, a distributed
and adaptive learning algorithm was proposed to be used for
the secondary users to estimate spectrum price and adjust the
spectrum demand accordingly so that a fair market equilibrium
can be reached.
In this paper, we propose an iterative process based on the
theory of closed-loop control system that conveniently con-
verges to the Walrasian equilibrium. Stability and convergence
of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated through simula-
tions. Our main contributions in this work are as follows:
• We propose a numerical solution to find Walrasin equi-
librium without any assumption on the format of clients’
utility functions; it is only required that the clients’ utility
functions be quasi-concave;
• Scalability of the model in terms of the number of clients
is established through numerical results;
• Stability of the proposed approach to find the Walrasian
equilibrium is guaranteed as the sum on absolute excess
demand progressively converges to zero.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we formally state the principles of Walrasian equilibrium
in an exchange economy. In Section 3, we introduce the
proposed control-theoretic algorithm to find the Walrasian
economy. In Section 4, the convergence and stability of the
proposed algorithm is analyzed. Section 5 contains a case
study, applying the proposed algorithm in a dynamic spectrum
allocation problem as a sample application area and finally
Section 6 contains the conclusion and final remarks.
II. EXCHANGE ECONOMY AND WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM
Let us consider an exchange market where different sellers
and buyers are to exchange their commodities. In a clean
market state, all commodities are expected to be fully assigned.
There is an equilibrium price for each commodity at this
state. In addition, allocation of commodities to each client
is considered to be Pareto efficient [1]. That means, there is
no way to make someone better off without making someone
else worse off.
Consider the economy E where we have N commodi-
ties and M players, J = {1, . . . , N} is the index set of
commodities while I = {1, . . . ,M} is the index set of the
market players called clients here and that every client is
endowed with a non-negative amount of each commodity as
its initial asset. Client’s commodity preferences is defined on
the consumption set RN+ , denoting positive real numbers, and
their utilities are represented by a utility function ui fulfilling
some set properties.
In the competitive exchange process, all clients know about
the prices of all commodities, and they act as both a buyer
and a seller; i.e., a client can sell her goods to buy goods
from other clients. Mapping this to a real market, money can
be also considered as a special commodity where the sellers
are only interested in this type of commodity.
Suppose p = (p1, . . . , pN ) ≫ 0 is the vector of prices
for N available commodities, and ei = (ei1, . . . , e
i
N ) is the
initial asset or initial endowment of client i. The vector xi =
(xi1, . . . , x
i
N ) denotes the amounts of client i from N different
commodities after redistribution of commodities that we call
it as “demand allocation vector”. Clients try to increase their
payoff through the exchange process simultaneously, which is







subject to: p · xi 6 p · ei (1b)
x
i ∈ RN+ (1c)
The factor p · ei is a constant value in the optimization
problem that determines the client’s budget. Therefore, (1b)
demonstrates the client’s budget constraint and limits the
client’s purchase power to its total budget. The outcome of
this optimization problem solved independently by each client
i is χi(p) which represents the best and most favorable request
bundle for each client and depends on the current price vector
and the client’s initial asset (xi = χi(p)). However, the supply
limitation is not enforced, i.e. commodity availability is not
considered. Hence, the overall demand for some commodities
may excess the available supply. To formulate supply surplus
or shortage, we define the aggregate excess demand for










Here, eij denotes the amount of commodity j that client i
has and xij denotes the amount of commodity j that client i
desires to have. As xi is a function of price p, (xi = χi(p)), in
this regard, we can define zj as a function of price zj = zj(p).
There is excess demand for commodity j when zj(p) > 0,
and there is excess supply of this commodity when zj(p) < 0.
Thus, z(p) = (z1(p), . . . , zN (p)) is defined as the aggregate
excess demand vector as a function of price.
A. Principles of exchange economies
In the following, we describe the basic principles that apply
in an exchange economy that forms the basis for our proposed
algorithm explained in the next section.
1) Clients’ utility specification: Utility function ui for
client i, should be continuous, strongly increasing, and strictly
quasi-concave on RN+ [1].
2) Existence and uniqueness of the demand allocation vec-
tor: For every price vector p, we have a unique solution,
X = [x1, ..,xM ], to the optimization problem in (1) which
represents the most favorable request bundle for the clients
under current commodity prices and clients’ purchase powers
[1]. This means the exchange process has a unique answer
for each price vector where the utilities of all clients would
be at their maximum possible values if there were no supply
limitations.
Fig. 1: A system-level view of Walrasian Analysis engine
3) Walrasian Equilibrium (WE): A price vector p∗ ≫ 0
is called a Walrasian equilibrium if z(p∗) = 0 [1]. If such a
price vector exists, the sum of redistributions for a commodity
j is equal to its total initial supply by all clients:









Let p∗ be a Walrasian equilibrium for some economy with
initial endowments e, then X∗ =
(
χ1(p∗), . . . , χM (p∗)
)
is
called a Walrasian equilibrium allocation, or WEA.




i ≫ 0, then there exists at least one
price vector, p∗ ≫ 0, such that z(p∗) = 0 [1]. This claims the
existence of an equilibrium price vector p∗ ∈ RN+ that moves
the excess demand vector to its optimal state (z(p∗) = 0).
5) First Welfare Theorem: Every Walrasian equilibrium
allocation is Pareto efficient [1]. Therefore, there is no way
to increase the payoff of one client without decreasing at least
one other client.
6) Second Welfare Theorem: Any price vector p̃ that makes
the excess demand zero (z(p̃) = 0) is a Walrasian equilibrium
(p̃ = p∗), and the related allocation is WEA [1].
These principles establish the existence of the Walrasian
equilibrium and the related necessary conditions. However,
obtaining an actual solution is a daunting task and remains to
be a research issue. In the following, we endeavor to develop
a practical solution to find a price vector that results in zero
excess demand.
III. PROPOSED WALRASIAN ANALYSIS ENGINE
A conceptual view of the Walrasian analysis engine is
shown in Figure 1. The initial assets of clients and their utility
preferences that satisfies Principle 1 of exchange economies
act as inputs. Through interactions between the sellers and
buyers’ the price and demand vectors are adjusted indepen-
dently in a selfish manner. The final outcome of the system
is the optimal price and optimal allocations p∗ and X∗ that
results in clean-state condition.
We can consider the Walrasian analysis engine as a closed-
loop control system with feedback defined by iteratively
diminishing the error signal, z(p), its outputs converge to
the p∗ and X∗. The Walrasian analysis engine involves three
sub parts: client behavior simulator, market behavior simulator
and price adjustment feedback control box (Figure 2). Market
behavior is simulated based on optimization process defined in
Fig. 2: Sub parts of Walrasian Analysis engine.
(1). The feedback control algorithm used at price adjustment
box is the heart of the proposed approach that implements the
price adjustment process.
At each adjustment cycle t, the optimization problem in
(1) is solved by client entities. In our implementation, we
use CVX [14] optimization package to solve (1) to model
clients’ behavior as a convex optimization. By determining
all xij(p), ∀i, j in this phase, a central entity receives the
xij signals from all clients to calculate the aggregate excess
demand for each commodity j using equation (2). To arrive
at Walrasian equilibrium p∗, the system needs to go through
the price adjustment process. At each iteration t, we adjust
the price in such a way that the excess demand to eventually
be zero. Hence, the key point in pricing is that the price
for commodities with positive excess demand should increase
and the price for commodities with negative excess demand
must decrease. We propose the following adjustment policy
that demonstrates favorable convergence properties with low
computational complexity for j ∈ {1, . . . , N}:






















j is total requested amount of commodity j







controls the rate of price
adjustment. The price for commodities with higher error
value |zj | are updated with higher rate. This means that the

















the total market budget clients are ready to be spent for
commodity j. This is divided to total amount of supply of
this commodity. This amounts to normalizing the error value
Fig. 3: Flowchart of the proposed approach for finding the Walrasian
equilibrium.
TABLE I: Three defined datasets








1 50 3 E = [185.60, 47.52, 171.85]
2 100 5 E = [206.93, 63.79, 223.72, 62.15, 191.52]
3 500 10 E = [490, 168, 490, 172, 502, 159, 500, 173, 500, 167]













is the error term that decreases through
system iterations.
The iterations stops when we meet the market clean state at









j for all j ∈ J . At this case, the
price vector converges to p∗(∀t > τ ; pj(t) = pj(τ) = p
∗
j ).
The overall flowchart of the proposed algorithm to find the
Walrasian equilibrium is shown in Figure 3. Using defined no-
tation Walrasian ǫ-equilibrium in [6], we defined an adjustable
threshold, ǫ, for stopping the iterations which describes the
acceptable level of the residual error. Formally, a Walrasian











j | < ǫ or
∑N
j=1 |zj | < ǫ .
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
To evaluate the proposed feedback based approach, we
generated some random datasets as reflected in Table I.
In our simulations, without loss of generality, we considered
the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function
as the following for each client:
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4: Utility function curve for a client in an exchange market with two
















∀i ∈ 1, . . . ,M, (5)
CES is one of the most popular utility functions, which
is widely used in micro economic theories and is a suitable
model for natural behavior of consumers. The CES utility
functions are increasing and concave for r > 1. The parameter
wij determines the weight of commodity j from client i’s point
of view. Figure 4 shows the utility surface for a client in an
exchange market with two commodities. We can find that the
utility surface is strictly concave.
The initial asset and weight vectors for clients are generated
randomly and we set r = 3 for utility functions and used
the threshold ǫ = 0.5. The result of applying the proposed
algorithm to find the Walrasian equilibrium is depicted in
Figure 5.
As depicted in Figure 5, the total market utility increases
from the initial level after the exchange process in all cases.
Also the Walrasian equilibrium(p∗) for each dataset is pre-
sented for each case. The system convergence shows favorable
behavior rapidly converging to optimal condition. Using Lya-
punov stability theory [15], the convergence of the system can
be readily proved as the first derivative of system’s potential
(a) Results on Dataset 1
(b) Results on Dataset 2
(c) Results on Dataset 3
Fig. 5: The reduction of sum of absolute of aggregate excess demands
(SAAED) (
∑N
j=1 |zj |) in subsequent iterations and convergence of price to
Walrasian equilibrium.
Lyapunov function V (p) = zj(p) is proved to be negative and
hence the system is asymptotically Lyapunov stable.
V. CASE STUDY: PRICING AND BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION
IN WIRELESS ACCESS NETWORKS
As a case study, to apply the proposed Walrasian analysis
technique, we consider multi-tenant wireless access networks
as is the case in HWAN where many wireless network
providers (WNPs) share a common radio spectrum. These
WNPs offer interchangeable wireless services to the clients.
The clients rationally form their request bundles based on their
own preference vectors. Figure 6 depicts a sample scenario
with three different WNPs.
The pricing of services offered by the WNPs is a central
issue to achieve market equilibrium or clean-state. We use our
Fig. 6: HWAN environment
Walrasian analysis technique to derive the pricing strategy of
the WNPs and as a side product, the final service allocation
bundle of the clients are also determined.
For a HWAN with N WNPs and M clients, the overall
process is as follows:
• Prepare a Walrasian market for M agents to exchange N
commodities;
• Initial asset of agents (e); Each client has an initial
asset according to current amount of its commodity;
e = [eij ]M×N ;
• Commodities’ weight vector (W); Each client assigns
a weight for every available commodity in the market;
W = [wij ]M×N is an M × N matrix that w
i
j indicates
the weight of commodity j from the viewpoint of agent
i;
• Uniform utility function: We use a uniform CES utility
function for mathematical tractability (5);
• Demand adjustment: All Clients’ adjust their demand






• Evaluating the excess demand: Based on current price
vector in time t, we calculate the excess demand for each
commodity as the difference between requested amount
and total available amount of that commodity using the
relation (2);
• Price adjustment: To arrive at Walrasian equilibrium price
p
∗, the system goes through a price adjustment iterative
process. At each iteration t, we adjust the price in such a
way that the excess demand to be zero. Hence, the price
for commodities with positive excess demand should
increase and the price for commodities with negative
excess demand must decrease.
Here, we assume a HWAN environment with three WNPs
and 50 clients, Suppose wi is the weight vector of client i.
The weight vector of all clients is generated randomly where
the average weights for three WNPs are [0.43, 0.41, 0.15] that
means the order of preference of WNPs is Net1 > Net2 >
Net3. As a numerical example, we assume WNPs’ prepared
service is S = [180, 270, 340] and the initial price (p0) for a
unit of WNPs service is 5 (p0 = [5, 5, 5]). We are looking for
X
∗ and p∗.
In Figure 7(a), we show that the sum of absolute of
aggregate excess demands (SAAED) (
∑N
j=1 |zj |) that is
7587.67 in first iteration converges to 4.42 in 7’th it-




(b) evolution of absolute aggregate excess demands for all com-
modities
(c) convergence of prices on iterations to [16.81,12.45,9.98]
Fig. 7: Evolution of system state (SAAED, excess demand per commodity,
price) through analysis iterations.
eration. We defined the condition
∑N
j=1 |zj | ≤ 2 to
stop the price adjustment. The values of sum of absolute
of aggregate excess demand in the first seven iterations
are [1832.04, 121.31, 26.62, 18.66, 4.55, 3.63, 1.70]. The ag-
gregate excess demand for all commodities is depicted in
Figure 7(b). We see that in the initial stages, there is excess
demand for WNPs 1 and 2 and excess supply for WNP 3 be-
cause the price of service for WNPs 1 and 2 are low rather than
price of WNP 3 and through Walrasian adjustment of prices,
the excess demand has dropped to zero. In the last iteration
the price vector (Figure 7 (c)) is p∗ = [16.81, 12.45, 9.98].
In this case study, clients update their request bundle at
the same time and also, WNPs as the commodity moderators
adjust their related commodity prices simultaneously. While all
decisions are applied in distributed agents, we find that the sys-
tem rapidly converges to its equilibrium. We have developed
a simulation environment using proposed formulations that
emulates the behavior of agents (clients and WNPs) through
which we could find the Walrasian equilibrium and the best
price that cleans the market.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a numerical approach for finding
the Walrasian equilibrium in exchange economic markets. We
modeled the Walrasian analysis engine as a control system
with feedback. Our proposed controller, all commodity mod-
erators adjust their prices simultaneously. We showed that over
time, the error rate decreases and hence the system converges
to its steady state, which is called ”cleaning market” state.
Based on Walrasian theorem, the steady-state prices reflect
the Walrasian equilibrium and the related allocation is Pareto
efficient. One of the most suitable fields for using the proposed
approach is HWANs where we have WNPs that compete to
sell their prepared service. We applied the proposed WAE
technique for pricing and bandwidth allocation in an HWAN as
a case study and deduced the WNPs’ pricing strategy and also
determined clients’ optimal service bundles. The convergence
of the system and the analysis speed was shown to be fast (only
four iterations in the scenario with 50 clients) with affordable
computational complexity.
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